


3 May 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/CCS/PRG (U)

FROM:

  
Chief, INS/FOIA and Privacy Group (U)

SUBJECT: List of On Duty and Former Employees Whose Service  
Carried Over From CIA Predecessor Organizations (U)

1. The attached list is being forwarded to you for updating and return to us. (U)

2. By way of background, in February 1977, CCS was provided a 46-page roster headed On Duty Employees and Former Employees Who Were Former COI, OSS, SSU, or CIA Employees. CCS annotated this roster by inscribing the letter "C" to the left of the name of any of the listed officers whose name required protection from release whenever it appeared in predecessor documents, either because the person listed in the roster was a current CIA employee or one who had retired in a covert status. For ready reference, the attached list was prepared from the CCS-annotated roster, which we presently hold and which we should be happy to make available to you should you wish to consult it. Since the names of predecessor organization employees are not routinely protected from release when they appear in predecessor organization paper, the list is valuable because it cites the names of employees described above who require protection today. (U)

3. Your cooperation in providing us with the updated list is appreciated. (U)

Attachment: a/s

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE  
ONLY when separated from attachment

WARNING NOTICE  
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR DECLASSIFYING DOCUMENTS ORIGINATED  
BY THE WORLD WAR II PREDECESSOR ORGANIZATIONS OF THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Director of Central Intelligence exercises exclusive or final original classification authority over all documents originated by the Coordinator of Information (COI), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). In light of the voluminous holdings of OSS documents (hereafter used to include COI and SSU documents as well) in records of those organizations which used the OSS product or otherwise dealt with the OSS, and in light of the limitations of time and manpower available for the 30-year review of World War II materials, this authority is being delegated to a limited degree so that non-CIA intelligence personnel can assist in completion of the task. The following special rules shall govern such review:

1. All classified documents or other material above described can be declassified, except those which, after review, are determined to contain information of the types in subparagraphs a. through k. below:

a. Information received from a foreign intelligence service through OSS liaison, whether that liaison sourcing is stated or only inferable.

b. Information which discloses the identity of foreign personnel in official liaison with OSS.

c. Information concerning communications intelligence, cryptography or related matters.

d. Information which names or effectively reveals the identity of any OSS sensitive source--human or technical, actual or planned. Classification will not be removed where any doubt exists. (Note: Captured enemy documents and personnel, refugees and casual informants are not to be considered as sensitive.)

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e. Information which reveals the non-official cover (NOC) status of personnel employed by the OSS or the nature of the NOC arrangement, including the NOC name, title, etc.

f. Information which reveals any of the arrangements involved in placing and supporting OSS personnel under official cover with any degree of sensitivity attaching.

g. Information which reveals any aspect of agent spotting, recruitment, development, handling or support, the assignment of tasks, the levying of requirements, and the agent's manner of response and means of reporting or contact.

h. Information disclosing the design and operating characteristics of special devices used or under development by the OSS in support of operations in the field.

i. Information disclosing the manner and degree of financial support given to foreign political organizations and movements, and the means used to obtain and transmit such support.

j. Information which could adversely affect the conduct of present and future U. S. foreign relations.

k. Information which conceivably could place in jeopardy the life of any individual.

2. All of the documents exempted from declassification under any of the above provisions of subparagraphs a. through k. will be tabbed for further review by CIA officers. No downgrading to Secret or Confidential is authorized by these guidelines.

3. All documents deemed to qualify for declassification under the guidelines herein provided will be marked with an appropriate stamp to show that declassification action was taken under the terms of this declassification authority.